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Many regional organisations in Latin America are currently in crisis. Trade 
agreements, however, have made progress in the region. Today, 80 per cent 
of intra-regional trade is already under preferences. In March 2017 several 
international financial organisations – the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) – 
each independently proposed the creation of a Latin American and Carib-
bean free trade area.
 • Although ideological polarisation and the economic crisis led to a stagnation 
of high-flying regional cooperation projects, regional projects with more prag-
matic and issue-specific objectives, such as the Pacific Alliance (PA), are gain-
ing ground. 
 • In contrast to Trump’s protectionist policies, an overwhelming majority of Latin 
Americans support free trade with neighbouring countries and regional eco-
nomic integration.
 • Tariffs are no longer the main obstacles to increasing trade in Latin America. 
The existing network of preferential trade agreements in Latin America pro-
vides a platform for the implementation of a regional free trade area.
 • The elimination of non-tariff measures, the harmonisation of rules of origin, 
and the lowering of transport costs by improving the infrastructure and the 
interoperability of national customs systems can increase intra-regional trade.
 • Pragmatic regionalism strives for a harmonisation of rules and standards but 
does not aspire to create supranational institutions.
Policy Implications
The advances of Latin American economic regionalism have been underrated; 
they should be more capitalised because the economic strength of a country’s re-
gion conditions the success of global integration strategies. Hence, Latin America 
needs to develop a policy that combines efforts to integrate both at the regional 
level and globally. The European Union should both support Latin American eco-
nomic integration and open its markets to competitive Latin American export 
products.
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Latin American Regionalism in Flux
“Regionalisation” refers to transnational social, economic, political, and cultural 
interactions (including areas such as trade and foreign direct investment) that cre-
ate a regional space. In contrast, “regionalism” refers to state-led political projects 
and policies that aim to organise a regional space. Regionalism can be an upshot of 
growing regionalisation but can also have the objective to advance regionalisation 
as has typically been the case in Latin America.
Latin America has a long history of regional integration projects – at least three 
waves since the 1960s. However, all of these regional projects had weak economic 
bases (e.g. linked to preceding intra-regional trade or regional infrastructure) and 
normally only managed to secure low levels of compliance in regard to the agreed 
benchmarks.
These projects very much depended on the will of presidents – or “presidential 
diplomacy” (Malamud 2005) – and the political constellation at the time. Today (as 
in the past), regional projects can be interpreted as reactions to perceived external 
risks and structural changes in the world economy. This can currently be seen in 
the case of growing US protectionism, which especially affects the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Mexico. At the same time, the economic clout 
of the Asia-Pacific region constitutes both a push and pull factor for Latin American 
regionalism, resulting in cross-regional projects.
In the 1990s Latin American regional projects advanced economic integra-
tion with the goal of making regional economies more competitive in the world 
economy. This strand of regional integration projects was labelled “open regional-
ism.” Mercosur (Mercado Común del Cono Sur), the Andean Community (formerly 
the Andean Pact), and the Central American Integration System all followed this 
logic. Later, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, regional projects were 
less trade based and more politically oriented. Starting with the anti–free trade 
project ALBA (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América; 2004) and 
then with UNASUR (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas; 2008), the first exclusively 
South American regional organisation, the focus changed to political cooperation 
in the areas of security, conflict mediation, health, culture, education, science, and 
infrastructure, inter alia. 
Currently, most Latin American regional projects are in crisis or stagnating. 
These projects were launched at specific junctures by political leaders – such as the 
Brazilian president Lula or the late Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez – who con-
vinced their colleagues to create new regional organisations (or relaunch existing 
ones). Latin America has seen the highest number of regional organisations created 
since 1990. Today, Latin America suffers from a lack of regional leadership. Most 
presidents are forced to concentrate their energy on surviving in a hostile domestic 
environment. What is more, ideological conflicts between Latin American govern-
ments – for example, in relation to the Venezuelan crisis – have divided the region 
and made regional cooperation more difficult. 
But there are countercurrents which may result in a new regional dynamic cap-
able of facilitating more regionalism and regionalisation. On the one hand, there is a 
new type of regional organisation – the Pacific Alliance (PA) – which could introduce 
a different dynamic to Latin American regionalism. The PA embodies a new prag-
matic type of regionalism which is based on expanding preexisting bilateral agree-
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ments. On the other hand, the advances of Latin American regionalism have been 
underrated and should be more capitalised. Thus, future regionalism projects should 
be grounded in more regionalisation in the economic realm. Processes of economic 
regionalisation might induce new regional projects, not the other way round.
Good Times for Regional Economic Integration 
On 23 March 2017 The Economist published an article titled “There has never been 
a better time for Latin American integration” [1] – a title which, given the economic 
crisis in many Latin American countries and the stagnation of regional organisa-
tions, was quite surprising. In the same month the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) each in-
dependently published a document demanding more economic integration in Latin 
America. These groups’ respective documents coincide in many points and only 
manifest some minor variations in terms of their main suggestions.
The World Bank (2017) makes reference to the fact that Latin American and 
Caribbean countries held, on average, a preferential trade agreement with about 
four regional partners before 2000. By 2013 the number of agreements had in-
creased to 10. The IDB (2017) similarly emphasises that there are no less than 33 
preferential trade agreements between its regional member states and also points 
to the fact that some 80 per cent of the value of current regional trade in Latin 
America and the Caribbean is already under preference (excluding agreements 
that cover less than 80 per cent of products). Moreover, further tariff reductions 
have been scheduled for the future. Most subregional preferential trade agreements 
will have reached their full-liberalisation potential by 2020 (Estevadeordal et al. 
2016). Based on these advances, the IDB makes the case for the creation of a Latin 
American and Caribbean free trade area, which would constitute a market of scale 
for local industries with approximately 7 per cent of global gross domestic product 
(GDP). The IMF (2017) concurs with the idea of establishing a regional free trade 
agreement (FTA) that goes beyond liberalising trade tariffs and focuses on lowering 
non-tariff barriers. And the World Bank (2017) encourages the integration of labour 
and capital markets in the Americas. 
There are signs of further trade liberalisation and economic integration in Latin 
America. Since 2016 the PA and Mercosur have been negotiating a closer cooper-
ation. Meanwhile, in Central America Guatemala and Honduras launched a customs 
union at the end of July 2017, which El Salvador and Nicaragua may join later. It is 
expected that the customs union will cut logistics costs between both countries by 
25 per cent and raise the GDP of Guatemala and Honduras by 1 per cent and 1.2 per 
cent, respectively (Gutiérrez 2017). 
Challenges Ahead
One of the challenges for regional economic integration in Latin America and the 
Caribbean is the relatively low share of intra-regional trade compared to other world 
regions. Exports are very much concentrated in the commodity sector (as a result 
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1990s, after the creation of new regional organisations or the revamping of existing 
ones, there was a significant increase in the share of intra-regional trade. However, 
after 2000, it dropped again. In most subregional integration schemes it is now well 
below 20 per cent – the only exception being Central America, where 32.4 per cent of 
Central American exports remained in the region in 2016 (but only 14.8 per cent of 
imports came from within the region) (SIECA 2017). Even though Central American 
intra-regional trade is quite high by Latin American standards, it is still well below 
intra-regional trade in Europe, Asia, or North America. Latin America needs to di-
versify and upgrade (in international value chains) its export product basket.
Large Latin American economies dominate intra-regional trade, which is seg-
mented according to the main subregional trade agreements. For Latin American 
nations, there is no trade hub comparable to China in Asia, while the United States 
is a more important trade hub than larger Latin American countries. As a result, 
trade is concentrated outside the region, with the United States, China, and Europe 
representing the region’s largest markets.
The question is about how to increase intra-regional trade. Moreover, one has 
to ask whether it makes sense to invest in regional integration instead of focus-
ing on integration into the global economy. The World Bank (2017) disputes the 
claim that distance no longer matters and that we live in a “flat world.” Instead, it 
contends that the geographic forces which shape economic performance have in-
creased. Thus, the economic performance of a country in both the long run and the 
short run is closely correlated with that of its neighbours. As a result, the geographic 
forces and the economic strength of a region condition the success of a country’s 
global integration strategies. Hence “it takes a competitive region to make a com-
petitive economy” (World Bank 2017: 15). As a consequence, the World Bank (2017) 
recommends a strategy that combines efforts to integrate at both the regional level 
and globally. And the IMF (2017) even argues that trade connections with regional 
partners might produce larger growth effects than inter-regional trade connections.
As the IMF (2017: 34) argues, Latin America and the Caribbean have not yet 
 fully exploited the opportunities for regional integration. What are the main obs-
tacles? A major criticism of Latin American regional trade agreements has been 
the delayed implementation of their provisions. Therefore, the implementation, 
util isation, and perfecting of existing agreements – the “software” of integration 
( Estevadeordal et al. 2016) – should be prioritised over negotiating new agree-
ments. There are, however, more challenges.
Tariff barriers are not perceived as important constraints on increasing exports 
in the region. In 2016 the IMF (2017) conducted a survey of Latin American and 
Caribbean country authorities on trade policy objectives and strategies and found 
that non-tariff measures – especially sanitary and phytosanitary standards and 
technical barriers to trade – were deemed more relevant than tariff barriers with 
regard to increasing exports in the region; infrastructural deficiencies (see below) 
and a lack of human capital were also mentioned. 
The so-called Balkanisation of regional integration agreements and the multipli-
cation of rules hinder states from reaping the full potential of existing trade agree-
ments. Moreover, the two largest Latin American economies – Brazil and Mexico – 
are not linked by a preferential trade agreement, nor are Argentina and Mexico. The 
World Bank (2017) advocates a deepening of economic integration between South 
America and Central and North America. To some degree, the PA is bridging this 
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gap by including Mexico and three South American countries. Moreover, two Central 
American countries (Costa Rica and Panama) are candidates for full membership. 
At the same time, Mercosur and the PA are striving for a closer cooperation: three 
Mercosur countries are observer states in the PA, and the PA’s three South Ameri-
can members are associated members of Mercosur. Meanwhile, the Mexican govern-
ment’s problems with the new US trade policy and the Brazilian economic crisis may 
be conducive to a closer economic cooperation between Mexico and Brazil.
Regionalisation through Regional Value Chains
The IMF (2017) argues that Latin American countries are undertrading relative to 
their economic fundamentals. Latin America accounts for 8.2 per cent of global eco-
nomic activity but only for about 5.1 per cent of global exports of goods and services. 
Most Latin American economies are characterised by low trade openness (exports 
and imports as a percentage of GDP). As a result, Latin America’s contribution to 
global value chains is very limited. The idea behind the open regionalism projects of 
the 1990s was to create economies of scale and improve the competiveness of Latin 
American countries in the world economy. However, with the exception of Mexico 
(as part of NAFTA), the level of participation of the different Latin American nations 
through integration schemes in global value chains and global markets for manufac-
tured goods did not really increase. Moreover, only North–South preferential trade 
agreements (such as the Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement 
[CAFTA-DR] with the US and NAFTA) had a positive effect on extra-bloc exports.
A major obstacle to increased intra-regional trade is the multiple rules of origin 
regimes that have been adopted in existing preferential trade agreements. Rules 
of origin are the criteria which determine the nationality of a product (including 
the admissible percentage of inputs or materials from third countries) for pur poses 
of international trade. The rules of origin determine what products can benefit 
from bilateral or multilateral tariff preferences. Therefore, international financial 
organisations propose harmonising the trade rules (especially the rules of origin) 
between existing subregional trading blocs. Removing these barriers would gener-
ate prospects for increased intra-industry trade and the formation of regional value 
chains. The IDB (2017) argues that extending rules of origin (or the cumulation of 
origin) between existing trade agreements could potentially double the impact of 
regional preferential trade agreements on the export of intermediate goods, which 
could subsequently be used as inputs in the exports of other Latin American coun-
tries. It estimates that combining trade agreements and harmonising rules could 
boost these exports by 9 per cent on average.
Infrastructure: The Hardware of Regional Integration
Transport costs in the region are generally higher than in other regions and develop-
ing countries. Latin America lags behind other regions in terms of adequate roads 
and railways as well as in port and airport efficiency. The IMF (2017) highlights weak 
connectivity between countries due to geographic factors and low investment in infra-
structure as obstacles to increasing trade. Although there are significant topographi-
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cal barriers in Latin America, these only partially explain transportation costs in the 
region. To adequately improve the region’s infrastructure investment of around 5 per 
cent of regional GDP is necessary; since 1990, however, investment in infrastructure 
has ranged between 2 per cent and 3 per cent of regional GDP (IDB 2014).
Modernising and expanding infrastructure is both a prerequisite and a tool 
for major economic regionalisation in Latin America. At the first South American 
presidential summit (2000), Brazil’s President Fernando H. Cardoso – with the 
support of Argentina’s President Fernando de la Rua – launched the Initiative for 
the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (Iniciativa para la In-
fraestructura Regional Suramericana, IIRSA), which is designed to plan and finance 
these kinds of projects. Later, the IDB, the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF), 
and the Fondo Financiero para el Desarrollo de la Cuenca del Plata (FONPLATA) 
joined the initiative by providing credits, while national development banks – espe-
cially the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) – co-financed such projects.
To a certain degree, the IIRSA was a regionalisation strategy which preceded the 
foundation of South America’s first regional organisation, UNASUR (formerly the 
South American Community of Nations). The IIRSA became part of UNASUR and 
was transformed into the South American Council of Planning (Consejo Surameri-
cano de Planificación, COSIPLAN). In 2016 COSIPLAN’s portfolio included 593 
transportation, energy, and communication projects in South America – 22 per cent 
of which have been concluded and 31 per cent of which are being implemented at a 
cost of USD 105.336 billion (Beliz and Chelala 2016: 51).
Public Support for Integration and Regionalisation
According to a 2016 INTAL/Latinobarómetro survey (Beliz and Chelala 2016) [2] a 
high proportion of Latin Americans support political integration (60 per cent) and 
even more support economic integration (77 per cent). The highest levels of support 
(> 80 per cent) are found in Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Argentina; the low-
est support (< 70 per cent), in Guatemala, Brazil, and Mexico. Surprisingly, even in 
times of growing protectionism and nationalism, a high percentage (69 per cent) of 
Latin Americans are in favour of free trade with other countries in the region.
Although Latin Americans broadly support regional integration, the concept 
does not mean the same thing to all people. The 2016 INTAL/Latinobarómetro sur-
vey found that regional integration meant free trade to 56 per cent of Latin Ameri-
cans, political dialogue to 41 per cent, the free movement of people to 34 per cent, 
the promotion of national and foreign investment to 32 per cent, scientific and aca-
demic exchange to 30 per cent, and Latin American political unity vis-à-vis world 
powers to 21 per cent.
A Lean Institutional Structure
For several decades, the European Union (and its predecessor the European Eco-
nomic Community) was a role model of regional integration and institution build-
ing for Latin America – a region that had been criticised for its lack of supranational 
institutions. Thus regional organisations like Mercosur and the Andean Commu-
2 The survey covered 
18 countries with around 
20,000 face-to-face 
interviews.
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nity, which were created or restructured in the 1990s, still bear a resemblance to 
the European model.
For example, Mercosur, the Andean Community, and the Central American Inte-
gration System all have a parliament which was, at some point, an important element 
of regional integration projects. The PA, the most recently created regional organ-
isation, instead adopted a watered-down inter-parliamentarian monitoring commis-
sion (Comisión Interparlamentaria de Seguimiento de la Alianza del Pacífico), which 
has quite a fluid composition; nor does it have a dispute settlement mechanism or 
a court. Moreover, Mercosur and the Andean Community – unlike the PA, CELAC 
(Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños), and ALBA – both have tech-
nical secretariats (Closa and Casini 2016), which although not very strong, are still 
stronger than that of UNASUR.
Even though the lean institutional structure has been perceived as weakness 
in the past, international financial organisations like the IDB now promote it as 
the best option for the region. The IDB (2017: 64) is quite forthright on this point: 
“If anything can be learned from more than a half-century of integration, it is that 
complex architecture like a customs union with supranational institutions should 
be avoided. Instead, the objective should be a ‘plain vanilla’ free trade zone, with 
a focus on goods and services. … Likewise, the institutional architecture should be 
inter-governmental rather than supranational in nature, with a commission made 
up of ministers or senior-level officials overseeing the implementation and opera-
tion of the agreement and guiding its future evolution.” From this perspective, the 
PA might become the new role model for Latin American economic integration.
Cross-Regionalism: The Pacific Alliance
The PA is Latin America’s youngest regional organisation, having been created with 
the signing of a constitutive treaty by the presidents of Chile, Colombia, Peru, and 
Mexico in June 2012. As outlined in its various declarations, the primary goal of the 
PA is to build a zone of deep economic integration and ensure progress towards the 
free movement of goods, services, capital, and people. A supplementary agreement 
eliminating tariffs for 92 per cent of mutual trade came into force in May 2016. The 
remaining 8 per cent of tariffs will be gradually removed (as of mid-2017 around 
95 per cent of intra-regional trade had been liberalised). The PA is open to integrat-
ing more members; however, full memberships will only be granted to countries 
that already have an FTA in place with each PA member state – which was the case 
with regard to the four founding members. This is in contrast to other regional or-
ganisations, which were founded with the objective of creating a free trade area (or 
a customs union). Nevertheless, despite having some innovative elements, the PA 
also exhibits weaknesses similar to those of other Latin American regional economic 
integration projects. For example, the percentage of intra-regional trade (exports) 
amongst countries in the PA has not increased; in fact, it decreased from 3.5 per cent 
in 2013 to 3.2 per cent in 2015 (Durán and Cracau 2016). But this very low figure 
is greatly influenced by Mexico, whose main trade partner is the Unites States and 
which generally has weak trade links with the rest of Latin America. In the cases 
of Chile, Colombia, and Peru the percentage of exports to the other PA countries 
ranged from 6 per cent to 8 per cent in 2015 and had increased since 2013.
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The PA’s declared objective of the free movement of services and capital might 
prove more important than growth in the intra-regional trade in goods. Further-
more, the PA may reinforce member countries’ positions in third markets if not 
necessarily in Latin America. The PA complies with the World Bank’s (2017) recom-
mendation to deepen economic integration between South America and Central 
and North America. It has been quite successful in its strategy to integrate both at 
the regional level and globally. The PA now has 52 observer states (40 per cent are 
from Europe; 17 per cent, from Asia-Pacific) and, in 2017, created a new category for 
associated members, which reaches out to the Pacific Rim and includes Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, and Singapore.
The PA can become a dynamic factor in Latin American economic integration 
and development by promoting free trade, advancing trade facilitation measures 
(regulatory issues, border controls, etc.), harmonising and accumulating rules of 
origin, easing the mobility of people between labour markets, promoting foreign 
direct investment, integrating financial markets, and increasing economic links to 
the Asia-Pacific region through regional FTAs. The IDB (2017: 67) recommends 
that the region head towards a new all-encompassing, region-wide agreement and 
claims that “To get there, the Pacific Alliance offers what has been, so far, the most 
successful road map.”
Conclusion: An Era of Pragmatic Regionalism
As the second decade of the twenty-first century draws to a close, one should not ex-
pect new regional projects in Latin America. It will be difficult enough to keep alive 
all the existing ones. It is a moment to take stock, to evaluate the advances in and the 
obstacles to the processes of regional cooperation and integration, and to identify the 
basis for realistic improvements in the future. It is a moment for pragmatic region-
alism and creating linkages to other regions (cross-regionalism). Currently, a strat-
egy based on pragmatic progress seems more promising than a new wave of regional 
ideal ism. Moreover, there is a solid material basis for pragmatic advances. More than 
80 per cent of intra-regional trade is already under preferences. Thus, most of the 
adjustment costs after trade liberalisation have already been paid. From this perspec-
tive, the existing network of preferential trade agreements provides a very useful plat-
form for expansion and the implementation of a regional free trade area. This can be 
done step by step and country by country. Not all countries will (or must) participate. 
It can be promoted by technocrats and does not necessarily need regional leaders 
(who can nevertheless be helpful). The regional harmonisation of rules of origin can 
be framed as a technical problem, which may help to reduce pol itical resistance. And 
in the future, increased economic regionalisation might spur new regionalist projects.
This is a propitious moment for Europe both to support regional integration 
in Latin America and to promote more trade between the two regions. In the past 
couple of years many pro-trade governments have come to power in Latin America. 
Furthermore, the European Union has already signed free trade agreements with 
all PA member states and all Central American countries; next year, it might also 
sign an agreement with Mercosur. Finally, enhanced trade relations with Europe 
might also enable Latin America to counterbalance its growing trade dependency 
on China and Asia.
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